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Abstract 
 
Audits are a key means to monitor and ensure quality of care 
and maintain high standards in the English NHS. Yet there is a 
perception that they can be gamed. This can happen, for 
example, when staff know that an audit will soon take place.  
Using a Regression Discontinuity Design on data for 205 
English NHS hospitals, covering the period 2011-2014, we 
tested whether perceptions of cleanliness increased during 
periods when inspections occurred.  
Our results show that during the period within 2 months of 
when hospitals were being inspected we observed a significant 
elevation in patients reporting greater cleanliness, by around 
9%. This association was consistent even after adjusting for 
secular time trends. These associations were concentrated in 
hospitals which outsource cleaning services and were not 
detected in those using NHS cleaning services.  
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Introduction 
A pre-requisite for a competitive market in health care, such 
as that established by the English 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act, is the existence of valid information on the performance 
of providers. This is necessary for informed purchasing of 
services. Yet, as has long been noted, this can be difficult 
because, other than for certain easily standardised services, 
many aspects of health care are difficult to specify(1) and 
there are strong incentives for opportunistic behaviour, or 
gaming.(2) This can take many forms, such as changing 
behaviour, for example by avoiding complex cases, or changing 
how things are recorded, such as adding diagnostic codes to 
make patients appear more severely ill than they are.(3)  
One area of concern relates to external inspections of 
providers, such as those undertaken by one of the regulators 
in the NHS in England, the Care Quality Commission, as noted 
on several occasions by the House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee.(4) These concerns are echoed in education, which 
has also seen a marked increase in inspections and where there 
have been many accounts of opportunistic behaviour,(5) such as 
schools being warned about “unplanned” inspections or the 
temporary exclusion of disruptive or low ability students from 
testing(6-8) or even changing the food provided in school 
cafeterias with the dubious intention of boosting students’ 
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performance(9) (with questionable impacts on their 
health).(10, 11) 
Hospital cleanliness has been high on the agenda of successive 
governments in the United Kingdom, reflecting a combination of 
both appropriate concern about hospital acquired infection and 
the exploitation of data by some media outlets.(12) Even 
though the intensity of coverage has diminished, it has not 
stopped. (13-17) 
Consequently, the NHS Ten-Year Plan, launched in 2000,(18) 
established a series of “nation-wide clean-up campaigns” to 
improve cleanliness in hospitals. These involved 
‘unannounced’ inspections (although staff were always given 48 
hours’ notice) which would take place over the course of up to 
one month, by teams composed initially of hospital staff and 
patients. However, a lack of patient volunteers meant that 
they subsequently drew mainly on NHS staff. 
From the outset, there has been concern about the potential 
for gaming of cleanliness audits. It is widely believed that, 
since staff know when each inspection will happen, they are 
incentivised to make a special effort in the period leading up 
to it, subsequently relaxing their standards. It might be that 
this would be especially prominent in services which are 
outsourced to private contractors, given the risk of failing 
to achieve contract renewal should their performance receive 
poor scores in NHS inspections. 
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The true extent and consequences of gaming in the NHS are 
poorly understood but there is enough evidence to raise 
concerns, with Mannion and Braithwaite finding 20 distinct 
forms of dysfunctional responses to the NHS performance 
management regime. (19) Bevan and Hood give examples of poor 
performance in areas not measured, hitting the target but 
missing the point, and ambiguities or fabrication of data.(20) 
Another review of responses to targets identified creation of 
target-free zones, either physically (e.g. awaiting admission 
in temporary facilities in hospital car parks) or 
administratively (e.g. informal “waiting lists” to get on 
official waiting lists), and exploiting the opportunity to 
remove patients from waiting lists if they decline an offer of 
admission by making offers during holiday periods.(21)In 
addition, two studies found that financial incentives to 
physicians increase the likelihood that they will manipulate 
lists of patients by excluding those whose presence impedes 
their achievement of targets. (22, 23)  
In these circumstances, it seems plausible that gaming of 
audits of hospital cleaning, cannot be excluded; information 
we obtained from two acute Trusts under Freedom of Information 
legislation revealed that they actually had between two and 
five months’ notice of inspections.  
Here, for the first time to our knowledge, we look for 
evidence of possible ‘gaming effects’, by taking advantage of 
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a unique source of data which links patients’ perception of 
cleanliness, with hospital audits date covering the years 
2011-2014. Specifically, we test whether patients report 
higher cleanliness in the months leading up to an inspection 
than at other times, which would be consistent with the 
hypothesis that gaming does take place.   
 
Data and Methods 
 
We linked data on patients’ perceptions of cleanliness with 
dates of hospital cleaning inspections for 205 English 
hospitals. All analyses are conducted at hospital level. 
Patient-reported cleanliness data were obtained from the 
Picker Institute NHS Patient Survey Programme.(24) Each Trust 
(public organisation operating one or more health care 
providers, including hospitals in England) sends a questionnaire 
to 850 patients who have spent at least one night in hospital 
between June and August each year. They are asked to report on 
experiences at any time in the year although, in practice, 93% 
of reports describe experiences in this three-month period.   
All the sampled patients were asked “In your opinion, how clean 
was the hospital room or ward that you were in?  Very clean 
(excellent), fairly clean, not very clean, not clean at all”. We 
re-coded the data by  hospital, and matched this with the month 
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of audit, obtained from Patient Environment Action Teams 
(PEAT)(2011-2)(25) and Patient-Led Assessments of the Care 
Environment (PLACE)(2013-4) (note: the name changed but 
collection practices did not).(26) We aggregated these to 
measure the median percentage of patients giving an excellent 
cleanliness score for each hospital by month and year.   
Additional data on size and services provided by the hospitals 
were taken from the Estates Return Information Collection (ERIC) 
for the period 2011-2014.(27)  
We matched data based on the calendar year for PEAT/PLACE and 
NHS Inpatient Survey. ERIC data on hospital beds, however, 
report in financial year terms, which we matched to calendar 
years. This is unlikely to confound the analysis since there is 
little temporal variation in numbers of hospital beds. 
Our initial sample included 492 English hospitals. 17 (3.46%) 
were excluded because they had no inpatient services. Another 
270 (54.9%) were excluded because patients had not been 
surveyed. Thus, the final sample consists of 205 English 
hospitals and a total of 907 hospital-months. Of these 125 
hospitals operated in-house, NHS cleaning services, and 76 
hospitals contracted with private providers, 4 operated with 
both NHS and private providers (i.e. hospitals which integrated 
outsourcing into a mixed public-private partnership). Web 
Appendix 1 Exhibit A1 (28) displays this in flow chart form. 
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Exhibit 1 provides further descriptive statistics for all 
variables used in the study.  
 [Exhibit 1 about here]  
 
Statistical Models 
To investigate the association between month of inspection and 
perceived cleanliness we use a Regression Discontinuity 
Design, (29) further details presented in Web Appendix 1 
Exhibit A2.(28)  
As shown in Web Appendix 1 Exhibit A3, (28) until 2012 (PEAT 
survey) the assessments tended to concentrate between January 
and March, whereas the PLACE assessments tended to span the 
first six months of the year. The main coefficient of interest 
is β, which estimates the average change in the median 
perceived cleanliness for hospitals during inspection months. 
All data and models were estimated using Stata version 13. 
Robust standard errors were clustered by hospital to reflect 
non-independence of sampling. 
Limitations 
As with all statistical modelling studies, our analysis has 
several limitations. First, we do not have the exact date when 
the patient was discharged but only the month so, when we merge 
information at site level, we cannot investigate a possible 
gaming effect within the month. This imprecision is likely to 
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produce conservative estimates of the magnitude of potential 
gaming behaviour. Second, although the magnitude of effect size 
may appear modest, this increment in perceived cleanliness is 
sufficient for sites to avoid threats of an adverse assessment 
and the consequences that flow from it. Third, ideally a 
comprehensive longitudinal dataset would be available that 
tracks independent patient perceptions of cleanliness across 
the entirety of the sites in the UK. This does not exist, so 
in this initial assessment, to our knowledge for the first 
time in the NHS, we have taken advantage of a large pooled 
dataset to observe if there is an elevation in cleanliness in 
the months just in advance of and during inspections, which 
reverts to its historic level after the inspection. A 
limitation is that this cannot identify individual hospital 
which are gaming but does point to characteristics, such as 
outsourcing, which may render them more likely to do so. 
Fourth, we cannot observe a uniform distribution both in terms 
of month of assessment nor in terms of patients responding to 
the questionnaire. This is a strength, but also a limitation, 
in that we are taking advantage of these available data to 
assess gaming effects. 
Our data are corroborated by other evidence. The FOI requests 
to sites about communication with cleaning staff in the months 
when inspections were undertaken reveal that detailed pre-
assessment checks, revealing longstanding problems that then 
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be addressed, were undertaken a few days before the 
inspections (see Web Appendix 1, Exhibit A4). (28)  
Results   
 
Association of Inspection Months with Cleanliness 
 
Exhibit 2 presents the median trend in patients reporting 
excellent hospital cleanliness in the periods preceding, 
during, and following an NHS cleanliness inspection.  In the 
months approaching inspection dates, cleanliness appears to 
rise, and then drops after the inspection period. Comparing 
the months before and after the inspection, on average, 
patient reports of excellent cleanliness are about 10 
percentage points higher (81.5% in inspection months versus 
71.9% in all other months, t-test comparison= -3.73 p-value 
<=0.001).  
To provide an illustrative example, exhibits 3a and 3b depict 
the trend for the Royal National Hospital for Rheumatic 
Diseases. Inspections were in June 2013 and May 2014. In the 
months before each inspection, patient perceptions of 
cleanliness are relatively constant. Then, in the inspection 
month it jumps, and shortly after returns to the prior level.  
 
 [Exhibit 2 and 3a and 3b about here] 
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Exhibit 4 shows the results of our statistical models. In 
those months when an inspection took place the reported 
cleanliness rate jumped by 7.78 percentage points (95% CI: 
2.75% to 12.8%). To further corroborate our results we present 
visually the estimation coefficients of distributed lag model 
in Web Appendix 1, Exhibit A5. (28) 
 
[Exhibit 4 about here] 
 
Comparing Hospitals with Outsourced Cleaning Services to NHS 
In-house Services  
 
We applied a difference-in-differences model to test if those 
cleaning services operated by private actors were more likely 
to exhibit gaming behaviour.(30) As shown in Exhibit4 column 
2, higher cleanliness scores in inspection months were 
concentrated in hospitals that outsource cleaning services 
(11.0percentage points, 95% CI: 5.15% to 19.6%), whereas there 
was no statistically detectable association in those hospitals 
using in-house NHS cleaning services (2.68 percentage points, 
95% CI: -3.52% to 8.88%). To further corroborate our results 
we present visually the estimation coefficients of distributed 
lag model in Exhibit A6 in Web Appendix 1. (28) This is line 
with a recent research that finds a greater incidence of 
11 
 
infection and evidence of poorer cleaning where it is 
outsourced.(31)    
 
Fixed Effect Estimation 
 
To test whether our results were driven by potential 
unobserved heterogeneity we used a within-group estimation. 
Our results clearly show that switching from a non-assessment 
month to assessment one leads to an increase in the reported 
cleanliness by about 2.54 percentage points (95% CI: 0.02% to 
5.06%). 
To further corroborate our results, we included a cubic term 
in the term “time to the inspection”, finding consistent 
results (β=2.86%, 95% CI: 0.06% to 5.67%).   
 
Robustness Checks 
 
We performed a series of robustness checks. First, we adjusted 
for potential confounding factors, including hospital size, 
complexity and time-trends. All results are presented in 
exhibit A7 in Web Appendix 1. (28) 
To identify whether these patterns were driven by a few 
outliers exhibiting extreme gaming activity, we removed 5% of 
our distribution (2.5% respectively from the bottom and the 
top of the distribution). As shown in exhibit A8 of Web 
Appendix 1, none of the results was changed. (28) 
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We further examined whether our results were confounded by 
some areas having low numbers of respondents. We restricted 
our sample to those areas with at least three hospitals with 
at least 17 respondents, so removing 10% of the lower end of 
the distribution in terms of number of respondent patients for 
each month (presented in Web Appendix 1 exhibit A9).(28) The 
results were consistent with our main findings, except for the 
fixed effect results, which are no longer significant.  
To ensure that our results were not driven by difference 
between acute and specialist hospitals, we apply two different 
robustness tests, presented in Web Appendix 1 Exhibit A10. 
(28) First, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to better 
match hospitals observed during assessment months and 
afterwards. This reduces potential confounding by comparing 
hospitals with matching size and complexity. More precisely, 
we defined as treated those sites observed during assessments 
months or shortly before and controls as the others. We 
stratify by type of hospital (specialist, multi-service or 
acute), hence generating three cells. Within each cell, we 
align the distribution in terms of hospital size via PSM (1 to 
many, with replacement). As goodness of fit we imposed a 1% 
caliper, meaning that those matching couples which have a 
difference in their propensity score larger than 0.01 were 
automatically discarded. Second, we restrict our sample only 
to specialist sites. In both cases, none of our results 
changed qualitatively.  
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Finally, to further corroborate our gaming hypothesis we 
analysed the response pattern to food quality (Exhibit A11 in 
Web Appendix 1)(28). It is worth noting that the sample size 
drops because the assessment of food quality is available at 
Trust level only. Moreover, this is a good test on conceptual 
and empirical grounds. Conceptually, cleaning and food are 
different services. The companies providing these services are 
also different, if outsourced.  This makes it a specific test 
that it is cleaning not a general disposition to outsourcing 
that is problematic. Empirically we observe no significant 
correlation at trust level of cleanliness and food and 
hydration quality scores (ρ=0.11).  
 
Discussion 
 
NHS inspections are a core element of the regime designed to 
ensure that hospitals maintain high standards of quality. This 
is especially important when services, including cleaning, are 
outsourced to private contractors to save money. Yet, there is 
a perception that NHS inspections can be gamed. This can 
happen, for example, when staff know that an inspection will 
soon take place.  
By taking advantage of a unique data source, we can compare 
patient perceptions around the time of inspections.  We find 
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evidence consistent with gaming: in audit months and in a 
short period before, cleanliness appears to rise, and then 
falls in subsequent months. This pattern was most prominent 
for hospitals which outsource cleaning services to private 
contractors. This appears particularly relevant since a recent 
study finds that sites with outsourced cleaning services have 
significantly higher rates of methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus  (MRSA).(31)  
The findings suggest that gaming may be associated with a 9% 
higher score. This would be often be sufficient to avoid the 
severe consequences of an adverse inspection report, ranging 
from warnings to enforcement action of even restrictions on 
activity, with implications for the tenure of senior 
executives.  
Our findings have obvious implications for policy, given the 
importance of hospital cleanliness in the fight against anti-
microbial resistance (AMR).  However, they also have 
implications for systems of regulation and inspection. One 
obvious question is whether inspections should be announced or 
unannounced. This has several implications. For example, our 
findings suggest that hospitals invested considerable 
resources on preparing for an inspection. On the other hand, 
it is arguable that they should be investing those resources 
at all times. A recent systematic review found only 3 
studies.(32) The authors concluded that unannounced 
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inspections reduce the regulatory burden but there was no 
significant difference in what they found.  
A further question is the extent to which a system based on 
inspections is the best way of ensuring quality. A history of 
regulation in the NHS in England described a series of shifts 
from trust-based professional regulation to detailed external 
inspection, followed by some rolling back.(33) Changes were 
often driven by events that questioned the system in place at 
the time, rather than evidence of clear superiority of an 
alternative.  
While the characteristics of an ideal system are easy to 
specify, combining high standards with transparency, in 
practice, they seem more difficult to achieve. However, one 
lesson is clear. In any regulatory system it should be assumed 
that gaming will take place. The system should be designed in 
ways that minimise this. 
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Exhibit 1: Descriptive Statistics, for 205 hospital sites 
between 2011 and 2014 
Variable 
Number of 
Hospital 
Months 
Mean 
(S.D.) Min. Max. Source 
Median 
percentage of 
Patients 
reporting 
Excellent 
cleanliness 
924 72.1% (11.4) 25 100 
NHS 
Inpatients 
Survey 
Number of Beds 913 637 (493) 5 2257 ERIC 
Average length 
of stay in the 
Trust in days 
924 6.07 (1.56) 2.40 14.2 
NHS 
Inpatients 
Survey 
Multiservice 
sites (dummy) 924 
0.08 
(0.27) 0 1 PEAT/PLACE 
Specialist 
sites (dummy) 
924 
 
0.20 
(0.40) 0 
 
1 
 
PEAT/PLACE 
North of 
England 
(dummy) 
924 0.44 (0.50) 0 1 ERIC 
Central of 
England 
(dummy) 
924 0.27 (0.44) 0 1 ERIC 
London 
(dummy) 924 
0.11 
(0.32) 0 1 ERIC 
 
South of 
England 
(dummy) 
924 0.18 (0.39) 0 1 ERIC 
Hospitals for 
each month of 
assessment 
924 145 (49.9) 1 194 PEAT/PLACE 
Number of 
patients with 
non-missing 
data on 
hospital 
cleanliness 
survey per 
month 
924 205 (150) 1 552 PEAT/PLACE 
Notes: Merged data at hospital level from Hospital data from 
Patient Environment Action Teams (PEAT) dataset (from 2011 
till 2012), Patient-Led Assessments of the Care Environment 
(PLACE) (2013-2014), ERIC (Estates Return Information 
Collection) (2011-2014), NHS Inpatient Survey (2011-2014).  
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Exhibit 2: Median perception of excellent cleanliness among 
205 hospital sites between 2011 and 2014, by proximity to the 
month of assessment 
  
 
 
Notes: Merged data at hospital level from Hospital data from 
Patient Environment Action Teams (PEAT) dataset (from 2011 
till 2012), Patient-Led Assessments of the Care Environment 
(PLACE) (2013-2014), ERIC (Estates Return Information 
Collection) (2011-2014), NHS Inpatient Survey (2011-2014). 
Dots represent the median percentage of patients reporting 
excellent cleanliness for the room or ward were they stayed 
in, red dash line represents the month of assessment. The 
number of hospitals used to compute the graph (at month level 
is): 1(5), 5(4), 4(3) , 5(2) 9(1), 18(0), 59(1), 131(2),   135 
(3), 156 (4), 194(5).  The average number of patients who 
responded to the questionnaire (at month level is): 14(5), 
112(4), 29(3) , 30.6(2) 41.7(1), 113(0), 152(1), 189(2),   214 
(3), 208(4), 231(5). 
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Exhibit 3: Cleanliness perception for Royal National Hospital 
for Rheumatic Diseases in 2013 and in 2014, by month of 
assessment. Dots represent the median cleanliness perception 
by month, the red-dashed line represents the month of 
assessment  
 
a) Inspection in June 2013 
  
  
b) Inspection in May 2014 
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Notes: Merged data for the Royal National Hospital Rheumatic 
Diseases Hospital form Patient-Led Assessments of the Care 
Environment (PLACE) (2013) and NHS Inpatient Survey (2013). A) 
The average number of patients who responded to the 
questionnaire (at month level is): 14(Jan), 18(Feb), 28(23), 
16(Apr), 22 (34), 20 (Jun), 17 (35), 29 (Aug). B) The average 
number of patients who responded to the questionnaire (at 
month level is): 15(Jan), 19 (Feb), 10 (23), 11(Apr), 23 (34), 
12 (Jun), 18 (35), 23 (Aug). 
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Exhibit 4:  Change in the median percentage of patients’ 
reporting excellent in audit months and in a short period 
previously  
 
     
 Median 
patients’ 
perceptio
n of 
excellent 
cleanline
ss  
Unadjuste
d Models 
Median 
patients’ 
perception of 
excellent 
cleanliness- 
Outsourcing 
hospitals 
vis-à-vis in 
House ones- 
Median 
patients’ 
perceptio
n of 
excellent 
cleanline
ss  
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Median 
patients’ 
perception 
of 
excellent 
cleanliness  
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
  Unadjusted    
Inspection 
month 
 
7.78%*** 
(2.55) 
2.68% 
(3.14) 
2.54%** 
(1.27) 
2.86%** 
(1.42) 
Time to 
inspection 
-0.41 
(0.59) 
-0.46 
(0.54) 
0.89%*** 
(0.29) 
1.04%*** 
(0.36) 
Time to 
inspection2 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.09%*** 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
 
Time to 
inspection3 
 
    
 
-0.01% 
(0.1) 
Outsourcing  -0.81 
(1.91) 
  
Outsourcing
* 
Inspection 
Month 
 11.0%*** 
(2.75) 
  
Size No No Yes Yes 
     
Complexity  No No NA NA 
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Non-linear 
Time-trend 
(including 
quarter 
dummies) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2    0.05       0.06    0.04     0.04 
Number of 
hospital-
months 
907       867 907 907 
Number of 
hospital 
205 200 205 205 
 
 
Notes: Source: Data from Hospital data from Patient 
Environment Action Teams (PEAT) dataset (from 2011 till 2012), 
Patient-Led Assessments of the Care Environment (PLACE) (2013-
2014), ERIC (Estates Return Information Collection) (2011-
2014), NHS Inpatient Survey (2011-2014), NHS Staff Survey 
(2011-2014), and Public Health for England (2011-2014). SE 
clustered at hospital site level.  
The dependent variable represents the median patients’ 
perception of excellent cleanliness for the room or ward where 
they stayed. The dependent variable has been aligned, through 
regression, on a quadratic function of the distance to the 
month of assessment, the assessment dummy,  the number of beds 
(size), whether the site is a specialist or a multiservice or 
another site-type (complexity), year and quarter dummies  
(non-linear time trend).  
* p < 0.05   ** p < 0.01   *** p < 0.001 
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